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THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW 
THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW. By John Owen Haley. Athens, GA: 
University of Georgia Press, 1998. Pp. 280. 
Reviewed by Kenneth L. Port 
No one familiar with Japanese law requires an introduction to John Haley 
or his work. With the unfortunate passing of Dan Henderson (a mentor and 
friend to one and all in the field of Japanese law) in December of 2000, 
Haley sits as the senior statesman of a small group of American legal 
academics who focus their academic careers on various aspects of the 
Japanese legal system. 
Although one certainly can quibble with some aspects of the book, Haley 
has accomplished something very important here: he communicates the role 
of the process of law in Japan as manifested in judicial opinions. His 
synthesis of a large number of cases into an interesting read really must be 
applauded. 
The book clearly is not written for the few American legal academics that 
study and write about Japan. It obviously is meant for those more casually 
interested in the subject of Japanese law. To be sure, Haley thoroughly 
grounds the work in a detailed analysis of interesting cases that serve to 
satisfy his thesis. There is nothing superficial about the work. However, in 
order to complete the work in two hundred pages and write to what then 
becomes essentially a non-technical audience, Haley is forced to paint with 
broad strokes. 
This is not a bad thing. In some ways, it is refreshing. Some work 
produced by American legal academics is so fraught with jargon and insider-
speak that the work becomes impenetrable to all but the specialists of that 
particular narrow field. Here Haley does an admirable job of communicating 
aspects of the Japanese legal system to academics of other disciplines and 
non-academics alike. The work, general as it is in places, is accessible and 
interesting even if you already know the conclusion. 
After introducing the structural nature of the Japanese legal system, Haley 
paints a rather compelling picture of law in Japan. Law in Japan, we are told, 
is a communitarian construct where there is great “judicial deference to 
community values.”1 Law is a “somewhat suspect but respected mechanism 
   Visiting Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. 
 1. JOHN O. HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW 196 (1998). 
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of state control in a communitarian society.”2 Law in Japan does not play the 
same coercive role dictating and sanctioning specific conduct as it does in 
other countries. Enforcement mechanisms are weak and often not utilized. As 
a result, in order to obtain the highest degree of compliance possible, both 
judicial opinions and public laws try to find the common ground or, that 
magic word, “consensus” regarding any specific subject.3 Although one does 
hunger for more specificity when reading The Spirit of Japanese Law, Haley 
does wonders in opening up a wide range of judicial opinions to support the 
point that Japan is a communitarian state, and that the judiciary reinforces 
communal norms in its opinions.  
Regardless, there is some very interesting data that Haley does not delve 
into. This may be because of page restrictions or because it does not fit the 
thesis of presenting the spirit of Japanese law as portrayed by the judiciary. 
The existing data does not necessarily contradict Haley’s conclusions about 
Japanese law; however, the reader may want to know Haley’s view of the 
data. For example, in the section describing the Japanese Supreme Court, 
Haley puts a very vague and positive spin on data regarding the composition 
of the Court and their educational backgrounds.4 Haley’s analysis of the 
implications would be very interesting. That is, Haley states that 121 people 
have served as Supreme Court justices since 1947—the date that the first 
Supreme Court was impaneled under the new constitution written by U.S. 
Occupation forces under the specific direction of General MacArthur.5 Haley 
provides data regarding the birth dates and education of the sitting justices in 
1997.6 He implies that the Supreme Court is made up of a balance of 
individuals with views representing a wide spectrum of this “communal” 
society.7  
 2. Id. at 20. 
 3. Id. at 39.  
 4. Id. at 109-14.  
 5. Id. at 114. This, in itself, is a startlingly large number for the American reader. By contrast, in 
the United States, there have been a total of 108 Supreme Court justices since promulgation of the U.S. 
Constitution, including 30 justices (9 sitting in 1947 and 21 subsequently appointed) since 1947, which 
is the same time period Haley considers in his calculation. See THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: 
ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, 1789-1995, 544 (Clare Cushman ed., 2d ed. 1995). The twenty-one 
justices appointed after 1947 graduated from eleven different law schools. See THE SUPREME COURT 
COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS 252-64 (Lee Epstein et al. eds., 2d ed. 1996). 
There are structural reasons why there have been so many Japanese Supreme Court Justices. Most 
importantly, they do not serve life terms. The average age of appointment is sixty-three and mandatory 
retirement is at age seventy. This fact alone means that the nature of the institution is significantly 
different from the U.S. Supreme Court where justices are appointed for life and, typically, serve for 
long periods of time. No such culture exists within the Japanese Supreme Court. 
 6. See HALEY, supra note 1, at 113. 
 7. Id. 
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That, however, is not the case at all. The Japanese Supreme Court 
represents the elite of the elite. In the twenty-year period between 1970 and 
1990, fifty-four people served as justices on the Japanese Supreme Court.8 Of 
those fifty-four individuals, all were male.9 Forty-two (78%) graduated from 
Tokyo University’s law department.10 Five (9%) graduated from Kyoto 
University, four (7%) graduated from Chuo University, two (4%) graduated 
from Tohoku University, and one (2%) graduated from Kyushu University. 
Of the fifteen sitting members of the Japanese Supreme Court on the date of 
this writing, seven graduated from Tokyo University, five graduated from 
Kyoto University, one graduated from Nagoya University, and one graduated 
from Chuo University.11 All fifteen were born between the years of 1932 and 
1936 and therefore were teenagers or young adults during the postwar 
Occupation.12 That is, nearly every one of the 121 Supreme Court justices 
Haley references went to either Tokyo University or Kyoto University and 
the great majority of these attended Tokyo University. It would be interesting 
to hear how this obvious data, some of which Haley references, fits into his 
thesis regarding law as communitarian construct. 
On one hand, it appears that the judiciary Haley relies on to reflect the 
spirit of Japanese law is, in fact, the community of the most elite. On the 
other hand, that conclusion may be unfair. The reader is left to reach his/her 
own determination, as Haley does not provide one. Again, this may be the 
point of the work: briefly describe the judicial system and not provide an in-
depth critique. With the information on the table, the reader is encouraged to 
come to his or her own conclusions. For example, in any given society, if 
virtually all of its Supreme Court justices graduate from one university, have 
the same professors, study the same materials, and have similar 
socioeconomic backgrounds that allowed them to gain admittance to that 
prestigious school in the first place, is it that surprising that their judicial 
opinions would represent a common and consistent view of society? Which 
communitarian viewpoint do these justices represent?  
 8. LAWRENCE W. BEER & HIROSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 1970 
THROUGH 1990 app. 1, at 645-50 (1996).  
 9. Hisako Takahashi, appointed in 1994, was the first female justice to sit on the Japanese 
Supreme Court. The second, Kazuko Yoko, was appointed in December of 2001. 
 10. Haley says this number is “over two-thirds” when explaining how many of the “law’s actors” 
graduated from Tokyo University. HALEY, supra note 1, at 42. 
 11. See Justices of Japan, at http://courtdomino2.courts.go.jp/shokai_e.nsf/View01?OpenView 
(last visited May 21, 2002). 
 12. This fact may appear to be tangential, but being a child in war-torn Japan, and then a teenager 
or young adult during the postwar Occupation, must effect one’s concepts of self, society, propriety, 
and nation. Haley’s failure to address this issue gives the unintended impression that the judges are 
inhumane.  
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Furthermore, Haley very interestingly claims that “Japanese judges thus 
form a remarkably autonomous bureaucracy . . .”13 He defends this point by 
pointing out that the Japanese judiciary has created a system whereby dissent 
is punished through internal means (largely decisions regarding promotion) 
and that, contrary to what others have argued, the judiciary is free of national 
politics.14 Thus, he concludes, the judiciary is remarkably autonomous. 
Haley uses a description of the so-called Miyamoto affair as evidence of 
the autonomous judicial bureaucracy. In 1971, an assistant judge by the name 
of Yasuaki Miyamoto was not recommended for promotion to full judge by 
“the administrative arm of the Supreme Court.”15 This was highly unusual 
because Judge Miyamoto had served his ten years and virtually all other 
judges who had served ten years were recommended to the cabinet for 
reappointment as full judge.16 In effect, the Supreme Court fired Miyamoto 
without a hearing, without due process, and without following the 
constitutionally required impeachment process.17  
Haley explains that the Supreme Court treated Miyamoto this way 
because he was a member of the Seihyokyo, or Young Lawyers League, that 
many believed had communist foundations. Haley further explains that the 
establishment judiciary “would not tolerate any significant departure from an 
essentially moderate-to-conservative approach to legal change and judge-
driven social reform.”18 The interesting part of this and the reason I point it 
out here is that Haley does not use this as an example of an insular group of 
elitist jurists harshly protecting their own political agenda, but rather as an 
example of the “remarkably autonomous bureaucracy.”19 It is a judiciary that 
polices, promotes, and punishes its own autonomously.  
This all seems perfectly true and accurate. However, what is missing is an 
analysis regarding the implications of having a judiciary that is so 
autonomous that it essentially can expel members, as it did in the Miyamoto 
case, in an extra-constitutional manner and still remain a legitimate source of 
information regarding the communal state.  
Regarding the legal profession in Japan, Haley provides a very interesting 
 13. HALEY, supra note 1, at 108. 
 14. See J. MARK RAMSEYER & FRANCES MCCALL ROSENBLUTH, JAPAN’S POLITICAL 
MARKETPLACE 164-70 (1993), noted in HALEY, supra note 1, at 107. 
 15. HALEY, supra note 1, at 106.  
 16. Article 80 of the Japanese Constitution reads in relevant part as follows: “All such judges 
shall hold office for a term of ten (10) years with privilege of reappointment . . .” KENP 
[Constitution], art. 80 (emphasis added). 
 17. Article 78 of the Japanese Constitution reads in relevant part as follows: “Judges shall not be 
removed except by public impeachment . . .” KENP, art. 78. 
 18. HALEY, supra note 1, at 107.  
 19. Id. at 108.  
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historical description of specific individuals who were important in shaping 
the concept of the role of lawyers in Japan and how lawyers in Japan, as in 
America, do not always enjoy a positive popular reputation.20 Most 
importantly, Haley weighs in on an important point he made well-known in 
1978: there are many more “law actors” in Japan than generally are 
recognized.21 Once again, a little data would have helped. Consider the 
following chart: 
Legal Profession in Japan 
(numbers as of Jan. 1, 2002) 
Japanese 
Name 
English Equivalent Duties Number 
Bengoshi Lawyer Private representation of 
individuals or corporations 
before a court of law or other 
legal body 
18,897 (10% female)22 
 
Benrishi Patent Attorney Prosecuting applications for a 
patent on behalf of individuals 
or corporations before the 
Japanese Patent Office 
4,66223 
Gyosei 
Shoshi 
Administrative 
Scrivener 
Administrative law specialists 
prepare documents for 
submission to gov. bodies; 
document submission; counsel 
clients on administrative law 
34,41424 
 
 
 20. Id. at 51-58. 
 21. John O. Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 359 (1978). 
 22. Outline of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, at http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/ 
en/about/index.html (last visited May 7, 2002). In Tokyo alone, the growth of the bar has been rather 
rapid as follows: 
 
Year Men Women (%) Total 
1951 1,395 1 (0.05%) 1,396 
1955 1,512 3 (0.2%) 1,515 
1960 1,702 17 (1.0%) 1,719 
1970 2,386 66 (2.7%) 2,452 
1980  2,802 120 (4.1%) 2,922 
1990 3,260 221 (6.3%) 3,481 
2000 3,593 432 (10.7%) 4,025 
 
See Members Profile, Tokyo Bar Association, at http://www.toben.or.jp/english.html.  
 23. The Japan Patent Attorneys Association, at http://www.jpaa.or.jp. 
 24. The Japan Federation of Gyoseishoshi Lawyer’s Associations, at http://www.gyosei.or.jp. 
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Japanese 
Name 
English Equivalent Duties Number 
Shiho Shoshi Judicial Scrivener Preparation of documents for 
submission to court 
17,07525 
Zeirishi Tax Attorney Dispensing legal advice 
regarding tax filings, preparing 
filings, and structuring 
transactions to minimize tax 
liability 
65,14426 
Koshonin Notary Public Authenticating documents, 
signatures, and dates 
54527 
Shakaihoken-
romushi 
Certified Social 
Insurance and Labor 
Specialist 
Focuses specifically on issues 
concerning social insurance and 
labor law  
25,00028 
Sha-in Employees of 
corporate law 
departments 
Rep. of corp. from licensing, 
leasing, contracting, etc. (J.D. 
holders in the United States) 
400,00029 
Total: 583,00130 
 
 
 25. The Japan Federation of Shiho-Shoshi Lawyer’s Association, at http://www.shiho-
shoshi.or.jp. 
 26. Japan Federation of Certified Public Tax Accountants Associations, at http://www. 
nichizeiren.or.jp. 
 27. See Japanese Notary Public’s Association, at http://www.koshonin.gr.jp/english/ekosho.htm. 
Although a notary in the United States would never be considered a provider of legal services, under 
the German system adopted by Japan, a notary does provide legal advice and services to private 
clients. As such, the number of notaries is included here. A notary in Japan is a public official 
appointed by the Minister of Justice and who works in the jurisdiction of a Legal Affairs Bureau in 
which the government appointed him. A notary is a type of judicial officer who performs his duties 
independently and impartially and who provides legal advice to private individuals and corporations 
alike. The Ministry of Justice may appoint a judge, a prosecutor, or someone with profound knowledge 
of the legal system. In reality, most notaries are retired judges. Their average age at appointment is 
sixty and they face mandatory retirement at the age of seventy. The 545 notaries reported here work in 
301 different notary offices spread out all over Japan. Their duties include attesting to signatures on 
documents, acknowledging the execution of documents, authentication of articles of incorporation, 
taking affidavits, administering oaths for the purpose of taking affidavits, executing deeds for 
conveyances, leases, loans and wills, serving writs on obligees described in deeds, certifying copies of 
notorial deeds, and fixing definite dates on documents.  
 28. Members Profile, Tokyo Bar Association, at http://www.toben.or.jp/english.html. 
 29. No official numbers of in-house law related workers are kept. One organization of larger 
corporations with legal departments (Keiei Hoyu Kai) three years ago reported their membership to be 
eight hundred corporations with fifteen thousand employees. See The Association of Japanese 
Corporate Legal Departments, at http://www1a.mesh.ne.jp/~keiei/opinion/opinion7.html. However, 
this number would include only Kigyo Homu, or official in-house legal department employees. The 
number of employees working in law-related jobs that would require a J.D. if performed in the United 
States is certainly much higher. This number is derived from information and belief colloquially 
distributed in Japan. 
 30. Any claim that compares the total number of legal professionals in Japan to other countries is 
ripe for dispute. Some of the individuals here play less of a legal function than others. Some say that if 
we include all of these disparate “legal professionals” in Japan in the calculation of total law providers, 
then it would only make sense to add to the number of “legal professionals” all paralegals and law 
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Accordingly, there are not only many more law students per capita in 
Japan than the United States as Haley points out,31 but there are more law 
professionals as well.32 This conclusion is in stark contrast with the Japan 
bashers of the early 1990s who made ridiculous claims such as that 70% of 
the world’s lawyers were Americans.33 
Haley’s point seems to be that, although communal in nature, the 
existence and effect of law in Japan is underappreciated by Americans. The 
data represented in the table above would have helped to prove that law 
matters in Japan. Based on that data, one might even argue that it matters 
more to the Japanese than to Americans. 
In Haley’s famous 1978 article entitled The Myth of the Reluctant 
Litigant, Haley argued that there is less litigation in Japan than in the United 
States. This is not because the Japanese innately believe in 
communitarianism but rather because the Japanese legal system is flawed.34 
In The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, Haley argued that a consensual 
paradigm emerged in Japan, not because of the instinctively cooperative 
clerks in the United States. On the Japan side, though, we also could add the significant number of 
Ministry employees who deal with law and legal policy on a daily basis, and if they were employed in 
a comparable American department certainly would be required to have a J.D. The most important 
point that the number comparison brings out is that neither I nor anyone else really can lay any claim 
to the absolute number of legal professionals in either country. My only point is to demonstrate that 
there are far more legal professionals in Japan than generally recognized. Haley is certainly aware of 
this. His comment on this data may or may not have ultimately helped his thesis. One way or the other, 
a comment on such data would have enriched his book. 
 31. HALEY, supra note 1, at 41. 
 32. Haley is not alone in pointing this out and this is not a new fact. See, e.g., Masanobu Kato, 
The Role of Law and Lawyers in Japan and the United States, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 627, 661 
(providing data that revealed that as of 1984, there were 159,000 law students in Japan as compared to 
120,000 law students in the United States).  
 33. Dan Quayle, Vice President of the United States, Address Before the American Bar 
Association (Aug. 13, 1991), in Federal News Service, Aug. 13, 1991, available at LEXIS, Individual 
Legal News, Federal News Service File. See also Saundra Torry, Quayle and Curtin Generate More 
Heat Than Light in ABA Debate, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 1991, at F5 (quoting Vice President Quayle as 
stating that America has 70% of the world's lawyers); James Bishop, Jr., Quayle vs. The Lawyers: The 
Hunt Is on for a Plump New Scapegoat to Blame for the Nation's Woes, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Dec. 8, 
1991, at C5 (reporting that critics of the legal system claim that the United States has twenty times 
more lawyers than Japan per one hundred thousand people); Ward Blacklock, Lawyer-bashing: It’s 
Time to Turn the Tide, 24 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1219, 1221 (1993), citing Ray August, The Mythical 
Kingdom, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1992, at 72 (arguing that the United States ranks thirty-fifth among all 
countries in per capita number of lawyers, and has only 9.4% of the world's lawyers, rather than the 
70% suggested by Vice President Quayle). Some commentators have made it part of their career to 
dispel the myth that America has fewer legal professionals than commonly believed. See, e.g., Marc 
Galanter, Predators and Parasites: Lawyer-Bashing and Civil Justice, 28 GA. L. REV. 633 (1994); 
Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 717 (1998); Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 
DENV. U. L. REV. 77 (1993). 
 34. See Haley, supra note 21, at 359. 
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nature of the Japanese people, but because they lacked the actual ability to 
get involved in the legal system. They wanted to litigate, he argued, but the 
system would not let them. Haley pointed out the long delays in trials, the 
expensive filing fees required by plaintiffs, the lack of contingent fee 
arrangements, and the lack of a jury system. Coupled with these defects, 
Haley pointed out, is a Japanese society that is very interested in law and 
legal rights. 
These facts led Haley in 1978 to the conclusion that the Japanese may 
want to litigate but are prevented from doing so by an impenetrable legal 
system. As such, I categorized him as a “revisionist.”35 In 1978, it seemed 
that Haley was making the argument that Japan should revise its legal system 
to make it more accessible to average people. If it were more accessible, 
presumably more people would be able or willing to litigate.36 It was not the 
inherent nature of the Japanese individual that was preventing Japanese from 
litigating, but rather the specific structural impediments within the Japanese 
legal system. 
In The Spirit of Japanese Law, Haley’s thinking appears to have evolved 
some. Community now matters more. Law, in the form of judicial opinions, 
matters as well but more as a manifestation of the legal communal state. 
“Putting aside the question of causes, the effects of such a prevailing pattern 
of interrelationships seem clear—a community whose members share 
significant gains by continued cooperation, with significant barriers to 
withdrawal as well as to new entry.”37 
Although Haley does recognize that the “community can indeed become 
the tyrant,”38 The Spirit of Japanese Law seems to represent the kinder, 
gentler John Haley. Haley appears no longer to be so critical of the Japanese 
legal system and its structural impediments. He now seems to be far more 
accepting of the consensual hypothesis. 
Be that as it may, Haley’s newest major work—which is as interesting 
and inspiring as the rest of his work—will open the doors to the Japanese 
judiciary for an audience heretofore excluded. Scholars and lay people alike 
who do not speak Japanese at last can objectively and accurately comprehend 
Japanese judicial thinking and analysis. This, in itself, makes the work an 
invaluable contribution.  
 35. See Kenneth L. Port, The Case for Teaching Japanese Law at American Law Schools, 43 
DEPAUL L. REV. 643, 664-68 (1994). 
 36. That argument has won the day, interestingly enough, as Japan is now considering radical 
judicial reform specifically designed to include private “lay” people in the judicial process and make 
the judicial system more accessible to all Japanese people. 
 37. HALEY, supra note 1, at 208. 
 38. Id. at 211.  
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